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Abstract 
This paper examines the short- and long-run behavior of tax receipts with regard to their tax bases. In addition, the 
possibility of asymmetries in tax responses is explicitly included. The methodology is applied to the three main tax 
categories in the Netherlands for the period 1971-2005, after removing effects from discretionary measures. The 
outcomes indicate that short-term elasticities can deviate markedly from long-term ones. Furthermore, short-term 
elasticities tend to be smaller in less favorable circumstances. Ignoring such differences between various elasticity 
measures may contribute to adverse revenue surprises. 
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     1.  Introduction 
 
The responsiveness of government tax revenues to macroeconomic developments 
is a key input variable for budgetary policy, used for instance by governments in 
forecasting revenue growth when preparing budgets. In addition, it plays an 
important role in cyclically adjusting budget balances. The relevance of accurate 
tax elasticities was highlighted in the mid 2000s when tax receipts in many 
countries improved by more than could be accounted for by combining economic 
growth rates with standard elasticities. 
Tax elasticities are usually assumed constant over time although there are 
good economic grounds to expect them to fluctuate over time. For instance, 
growth of household income growth in the short term may affect the more 
luxurious consumption items more than proportional, causing an increase in the 
short-term elasticity as these items are taxed more heavily than basic consumption 
goods. Also, the short-run tax response may be asymmetric, the elasticity value 
being different in times of high growth than in periods of low growth, for instance 
because of tax evasion intensifying in periods of below-average growth, but 
staying at that level in subsequent period of above-average growth.   
Ignoring short-term dynamics in elasticities leads to biased fiscal indicators 
based on cyclically-adjusting budget balances. Short-term variations in elasticity 
values also present a nuisance for countries and states complying with fiscal rules 
for achieving a certain budget deficit (e.g. a nominally balanced budget as in many 
US states), leading to a preference for countercyclical elasticities (see for instance 
Fox and Campbell, 1984). Finally, from a longer-term perspective, differences in 
short- and long-term elasticities allow circumventing a trade-off between tax 
revenue growth and stability of tax revenues: in principle, high (long-term) growth 
rates can be combined with short-term stability in taxes, and vice versa; an 
appropriate selection of taxes may deliver a tax portfolio closer to the tax frontiers, 
taking account of preferences regarding tax revenue growth and stability (see 
Seyfried and Pantuosco, 2003, for an application to US state taxes).  
This article focuses on estimating short- and long-run tax elasticities, the 
latter often being neglected, especially in European research. Another contribution 
of this paper is that we take into account possible sources of bias and 
inconsistency in long-run estimates of co-integrated relations. Finally, apart from 
error-correction, our short-term estimates also allow for asymmetric responses in 
tax revenues. This methodology is applied to the Netherlands, having a unique 
database on discretionary tax measures, allowing for deriving tax revenue series 
that reflect endogenous tax revenue growth.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discuses the methodology 
used for estimating short-term and long-term elasticities of tax receipts. Section 3 
contains the estimation outcomes for the three tax categories distinguished (value-
added tax, personal income tax, and corporate income tax). The final section 
contains our conclusions.  
 
 
2.  Methodology 
 
The focus of this article is on the base elasticity of taxes, measuring the 
endogenous growth in tax receipts following a 1% change in the tax base. The 
short-term elasticity measures the immediate change in tax receipts if the tax base   2
changes by 1 per cent, while the long-term elasticity gives the ultimate tax level 
following a change in the tax base by 1 per cent. Differences between short- and 
long-run elasticities can be expected especially for cyclically-sensitive taxes, 
fluctuating in line with the business cycle.  
  Long-term elasticities can be estimated as follows: 
 
log T05,t = θ + δ log Bt + γt                   (1) 
 
With   T05,t  = tax revenue in year t adjusted for discretionary measures 
θ   = intercept 
Bt  = tax base in year t 
γ   = error 
 
while for the short-term elasticity, a difference-equation is taken to arrive at 
stationary series:  
 
∆ log T05,t = α + β.∆ log Bt + εt                          (2) 
 
Making the distinction between short- and long-term elasticity values is a valid 
exercise provided the level of tax receipts and the tax base are co-integrated, and 
the difference-equation is stationary. The error-correction term derived from long-
term equation (1) then can be added to the short-term equation, reflecting that 
deviations from the long-run tax path may have an impact on short-term tax 
receipts: 
 
∆ log T05,t =  α + β.∆ log Bt + λ. γt-1 + εt                                                   (3) 
 
with λ being the adjustment parameter, indicating the percentage of last year’s 
deviation from the long-term tax level that is corrected in the current period. 
Short-term changes in tax revenues thus may arise from two channels: a direct 
one, via changes in the tax base, and an indirect one, via deviations from the 
longer-term tax path. As a result, a tax base may decline but tax revenues may 
nevertheless increase. 
This approach can be refined by allowing the tax response to the base to 
vary with the sign of the error-correction term, being different on both sides of the 
attractor (also see Granger and Lee, 1989). In addition, the error-correction 
adjustment may differ in magnitude depending on whether deviations from the 
longer-term tax level are positive or negative. Equation 4 shows how such 
asymmetries can be tested, by adding a dummy variable with value 1 in case of a 
positive error-correction term, akin to Bruce et al. (2006). The interaction 
between, on the one hand, this dummy and, on the other hand, the tax base and the 
error-correction term, captures the possible asymmetries. However, as elasticity-
values are state-dependent in this approach, a potential drawback is that outcomes 
are less transparent (Dye, 2004).  
 
∆ log T05,t = α + β.∆ log Bt  + σ. Dec.∆ log Bt + λ. γ t -1  + π. Dec, t -1. γ t -1 + ε t            (4) 
 
With Dec, = dummy with value 1 if the error-correction term is positive, and 0 
otherwise. 
   3
To correctly measure endogenous growth of tax receipts, the effects of 
discretionary measures on tax revenues need to be removed. To this end, we use 
the proportional adjustment method (Prest, 1962), which can be expressed as: 
 
T05,t     =  Tt   * T t+1  * ..…* T05                          (5)
                   Tt,t+1 * …. .*T04,05                            
 
with   T05,t  = tax revenue in year t if tax structure of year 2005 would prevail 
 T t       = actual tax revenue in year t 
 T t,t+1 = Tt - Dt 
        Dt       = amount of discretionary measures taken in year t  
 
Underlying equation 5 is the assumption that the effect of discretionary measures 
increases over time in line with the tax revenue growth. This approach results in a 
constant long-term elasticity which facilitates the estimation process.  
 
3.  Data and estimation results 
 
The approach outlined above was applied to the Netherlands, given that this is one 
of the few countries having long time series on discretionary measures. The Dutch 
ministry of finance has a database with (ex-ante) annual amounts of discretionary 
measures per individual tax category as of 1970, having the advantage of going 
back relatively far and of being consistent over time.  
  In particular, we use Dutch central government tax receipts on accrual-base, 
and distinguish value-added tax (VAT), personal income tax (PIT) and corporate 
income tax (CIT). The PIT includes the wage tax, which is a withholding tax for 
the personal income tax, taxation of non-wage income of individuals, as well as 
business income from retail business. The corporate income tax includes profits 
from all (large) corporations. In 2005, the VAT, the PIT and the CIT accounted for 
32%, 26% and 16% of total central government tax revenues respectively. The 
remaining 26% that fall outside the scope of our analysis mainly reflect excise 
duties and dividend-withholding taxes. Table 1 shows the growth of tax receipts as 
per cent of GDP, distinguishing between effects of measures and endogenous 
growth. It indicates that the two income taxes increased autonomously, indicating 
a progressive nature, but the revenue of the value-added tax would actually have 
decreased as a per cent of GDP but for the discretionary measures taken.    
 
Table 1. 1971-2005 tax revenue growth: endogenous and discretionary effects, 
% (-point) of GDP 
 1971  tax 
ratio  
(1) 






2005 tax ratio  
(1)+(2)+(3)= 
(4) 
VAT 5.8  3.3  -1.5  7.6 
PIT 10.1  -6.2  2.4  6.4 
CIT 2.8  -0.1  1.1  3.9 
Other 5.0  7.9  -6.5  6.4 
Total 23.7  5.0  -4.4  24.3 
Note: Totals may deviate from the sum of components due to rounding. 
* Including the effect of economic growth on the revenue changes from discretionary 
measures.   4
 
All tax variables, expressed in log-form, were tested for unit roots using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (see Appendix 1). Stationarity was achieved 
after first-differencing. For two tax categories, this was only the case after 
shortening the sample, namely for the VAT (1980-2002) and the PIT (1975-2005). 
As to the explanatory variables, most series exhibited stationarity after first 
differencing. All estimates include an intercept. 
As regards the long-run tax elasticity estimates, estimating equations in 
levels can give rise to biased estimates and inconsistent standard errors as levels of 
tax revenues and bases are non-stationary. Following Stock and Watson (1993), 
we use Dynamic OLS estimates (DOLS) to correct for the coefficient bias. 
Besides the current value, we use just one lead and one lag of the change in the 
independent variables to save on degrees of freedom. 
 
log T05,t = θ + δ log Bt  + Σ
1
j=-1 ø ∆log Bt+j + γt     (6) 
 
Furthermore, the Newey-West correction (Newey and West, 1987) was applied to 
reduce inconsistency of the estimates of the standard errors, similar to the 
approaches taken by Sobel and Holcombe (1996) and Bruce et al. (2006) for US 
tax series. Endogeneity of the tax base should not be problematic in this set-up as 
the tax receipts have been corrected for discretionary measures that could have an 
impact on the tax bases.  
After estimating the long-term relation, we tested whether non-stationary 
variables are integrated using a stationarity test on the residuals from the long-
term equations. The errors from the long-run equations were tested for stationarity 
using the ADF-test, which revealed satisfactory results (Appendix 2). In view of 
the limited size of our sample and possible non-linear adjustment that are known 
to reduce the power of the test (see e.g. Endes and Siklos, 2001), we did not opt 
for the Johansen cointegration test. Instead, there is a strong theoretical 
presumption of cointegration by the fact that the equations, while including 
behavioural elements, mostly are of an arithmetic nature as there is only limited 
possibility to avoid taxation if the taxable event increasing the tax base occurs. 
  
 
Endogenous VAT receipts were related to private consumption, the main 
expenditure items on which VAT is levied. The coefficient 0.9 (see table 2, second 
column) is statistically significantly below unity. This may reflect the upward 
effect of higher excise duties levied on some products on inflation: while these 
increases are fully reflected in the price index, consumption may decrease in 
response, leading to less VAT receipts. The high value of the adjusted R-square 
reflects the fact that the estimates for the long-run elasticities are in log-levels. 
Results for the short-term VAT elasticity (table 3, 3
rd column) indicate that 
when revenues are below equilibrium, the elasticity reaches 0.64, while when it is 
above the elasticity rises to 1.10. Such pattern could reflect a shift in the 
consumption pattern towards more basic, low-taxed goods and services when 
consumption and VAT revenues are depressed, and postponement of consumption 
of luxury goods and services, being higher taxed by VAT.
1 No evidence of 
asymmetric effects in the error-correction terms was found.  
                                                 
1  For the US, a number of studies also conclude rising household income elasticities for durable goods 
in case of economic expansions (see Fox and Campbell, 1984, and Otsuka and Braun, 1999).    5
 
Table 2 Long-term elasticities for main tax categories, using Dynamic 
OLS and Newey-West adjustment. 









Main tax base:  
Private consumption (VAT), 
wage sum (PIT), 







House price change    -0.33 
(-5.4)*** 
 
2001 tax reform dummy    0.08 
(9.5)*** 
 
Oil price       0.03 
(0.6) 
Period  1980-2002 1975-2005 1971-2005 
Adj.  R2  0.99 0.99 0.97 
S.e. of regression  0.007  0.020  0.045 
Number of observations  23  31  35 
Note: *, **, *** = significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
 
Turning to personal income taxation, the results indicate an overall long-term 
elasticity of 1.57 with regard to the wage-sum (Table 2, 3
rd column), the above-
unity value reflecting exemption thresholds and marginal rates increasing with 
income. A 2001 dummy measures ex-post corrections of revenues lost on account 
of the major tax reform in that year.  
In the short-run equation (table 3, 4
th column), the effect of changes in 
wages on tax revenues is higher than in the long-run equation, which may well 
reflect that employment in the short run is less flexible than in the long-run.
2 The 
error-correction term proved marginally significant, at close to 0.5, while no 
evidence of asymmetry was detected in either the tax base or in the error-
correction term.  
 
Analyzing and forecasting corporate income tax receipts is complicated, as 
reflected in the relatively low part of variance explained, on account of 
possibilities for carrying back and forward losses, and fiscal profits only being 
very roughly approximated by profits in national accounts. Oil prices were 
included as an additional variable to reflect the importance of natural gas 
exploitation for corporate revenues, with natural gas prices linked to oil price 
developments. One-year lagged corporate profits gave an elasticity value of 1.07 
(table 2, 4
th column), statistically significantly different from one, reflecting its 
slightly progressive nature resulting from somewhat lower corporate tax rates for 
smaller companies.  
                                                 
2 The elasticity of tax revenues to employment is around 1 if the wage-earner earns an average income, 
while the elasticity with regard to income per earner is much higher reflecting progressive tax rates. 
Short-term economic fluctuations may have relatively little effect on employment, especially in 
Europe, for instance reflecting complex dismissal procedures or because employers use natural 
attrition.     6
As to the short-term elasticity, we observe again asymmetric behavior (table 
3, 4
th column), with profits spurring taxation in case of a positive error-correction 
term, likely reflecting a lack of possibilities to carry-back or carry-forward losses 
in good times. The lack of a significant effect in case of below-equilibrium tax 
receipts could reflect the possibilities for loss compensation.  
 
Table 3. Short-term elasticities for main tax categories 






































   0.08 
(3.4)*** 
 




 0.90  1.57  1.07 
Adj. R2    0.66  0.60  0.55 
S.e. of 
regression 
 0.0064  0.022  0.031 
Number of 
observations 
 21  30  34 
Note: *, **, *** = significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
¶ No differentiation between above- and below the long-term level is applied as the two 
coefficients are not statistically different.   
 
  Generally, long-term elasticities are within the range for the short-term 
elasticities for the VAT. Noteworthy is the high value of the short-term elasticity 
of the personal income tax, above the long-term value, which can be explained by 
slow employment adjustment. Corporate income taxes, on the other hand, are less 
responsive in the short term than in the long term.  
  As a global check on the plausibility of the outcomes, we compared the 
results on (long-term) elasticity values with those derived by the OECD (Van den 
Noord, 2000), the ECB (Bouthevillain et al., 2001), and the CPB (2004). It should 
be noted, however, that differences in estimation set-ups hinder a straightforward 
comparison. As to the VAT, all three assume unitary elasticity, whereas this paper 
finds a slightly lower value (0.9). A direct comparison of results for the personal 
income tax is complicated by these 3 organizations distinguishing between the 
employment elasticity of this tax (unitary elasticity) and the tax elasticity with 
regard to income per employed (elasticity 1.9 for the CPB, 2.6 for the OECD and 
the ECB). Our coefficient of 1.57 for the tax elasticity with regard to the wage 
sum is a weighted average of the two elasticities above. Finally, as regards the 
corporate tax, all three organizations again assume unitary elasticity, whereas we   7
find a slightly but statistically significantly higher value (1.07), which may capture 
the slightly progressive nature of this tax due to lower tax rates for small 
companies. The IMF (2004) also estimated responses of some Dutch tax receipts 
to their bases, concluding an elasticity of 1.1 for the personal income tax and 0.9 
for the corporate income tax. However, they fail to correct the tax revenue growth 
for discretionary measures, and these coefficients therefore do not represent ‘true’ 
elasticities.   
Finally, while using long-term values of base elasticities of taxes can generate 
errors in forecasting and analyzing public finance developments, it must be kept in 
mind that many other factors play a role here too, including forecasting errors in 
GDP, and measurement errors. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper finds evidence that short-term elasticities may deviate from long-term 
ones, with differences being especially large in “bad times” (tax receipts below the 
long-run value). This may indicate cautious or lagged responses of economic 
agents, taking short-term developments less-than-fully into account on a real-time 
basis. Ignoring deviations of short-term tax elasticities from long-term tax 
elasticities adds to creating ‘budget surprises’. The outcomes also indicate 
asymmetry in tax-to-base elasticities in the value-added tax and the corporate 
income tax. The pro-cyclicality of these tax elasticities magnifies tax fluctuations, 
making it more difficult for policy-makers to control and to predict revenues, and 
thus public deficits and debt. At the same time, pro-cyclicality contributes to 
economic stabilization as effective tax rates automatically decline in “bad times”, 
and vice versa. In addition, it reduces the costs of stabilization measures in terms 
of revenue foregone in times when it would be needed most. While our empirical 
evidence applies to the case of the Netherlands, there is no reason to assume that 
the underlying mechanisms (higher luxury consumption on good times, loss 
compensation in corporate taxation) should differ in other countries and states.   
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Appendix 1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
 Estimation 
period 




Value added tax  1980-2002     1.08  -1.18  -5.04*** 
Corporate income 
tax 
1971-2005 -2.13  -3.33*  -4.89*** 
Personal income tax  1975-2005  -2.90*  -3.76**  -3.96*** 
Private consumption  1980-2002  1.18  -1.48  -2.79* 
Corporate profits  1971-2005  -2.05  -2.27  -4.42*** 
Wages 1975-2005  -0.98  -3.89***  -2.94** 
House price  1975-2005  -0.54  -1.61  -3.48**   
Oil price  1971-2005  -1.97  -2.07  -5.35*** 
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Appendix 2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on residuals from long-term 
DOLS equations with Newey-West correction. 
 Level 
Value-added tax  -3.12*** 




Note: *** = significant at 1% level. Results without intercepts (all insignificant). 
 